The National Human Rights Council (CNDH) continues to monitor, with deep concern, the mass crossings in the areas of Fnideq and Sebta and Beni Ansar and Melilla, as well as their serious implications for human rights, particularly the right to life, children’s rights, migration-related rights and other fundamental rights. The Council is also concerned about the circumstances surrounding these events, which may have seriously affected human dignity and physical integrity.

The CNDH extends its deepest condolences to the families of the victims of this tragedy and presents the public with preliminary findings and conclusions based on its field and digital monitoring, as well as on data it has compiled and cross-checked against multiple sources.

The Council’s monitoring and analysis have been guided by international human rights law and the international obligations relating to the right to life, personal safety, children’s rights, freedom from cruel and degrading treatment, non-discrimination and protection against malnutrition. These preliminary findings are presented pending the completion of further inquiries and the collection of additional information that may warrant the publication of a more detailed report.

I. Monitoring Approach

To further strengthen its monitoring and follow-up of both public and digital spaces, the President of the CNDH established, on July 29, 2026, a monitoring, coordination and follow-up committee. It brings together the presidents of the Regional Human Rights Commissions of the Oriental and Tangier-Tetouan-Al Hoceima regions, given that cases of mass crossings had occurred within their respective areas of jurisdiction, and the Casablanca-Settat region, in light of the Council’s findings that the region had become a departure point for gathering and transporting people towards Fnideq. The committee also includes the Council’s Monitoring Directorate, Digital Communication Directorate and an adviser to the Presidency.

The CNDH and its Regional Human Rights Commissions conducted field monitoring in cities where groups of young people and children had gathered or where mass crossing attempts had taken place. Field-monitoring teams documented multiple crossing attempts in Beni Ansar and in areas near Sebta.

Council teams and Regional Human Rights Commissions also heard testimonies from young people and children, both during their journeys towards Sebta and Melilla and in several Moroccan cities, as well as from young people and children in the vicinity of crossing areas in Beni Ansar–Melilla and Fnideq–Sebta.

The Council reviewed videos and testimonies relating to the mass crossings and the content subsequently circulated on digital platforms, including X, Instagram and TikTok. At the central level, the monitoring team also reviewed posts from 23 Facebook groups with a combined membership of more than 1.086 million users. Together, these groups published an average of more than 1,400 posts per day. Five major groups were deleted on Thursday, July 30, 2026.

II. Timeline of the Crossings

Based on its field, digital and media monitoring, as well as developments documented since June, the CNDH has established the following chronology of the crossings of Moroccan and foreign nationals into Sebta and Melilla:

June 16, 2026: 30 people seeking to migrate to Europe were intercepted in the city of Nador.

June 23, 2026: Around 30 people seeking to migrate were intercepted in the Souss-Massa region while attempting to travel towards the Canary Islands.

June 30, 2026: Security monitoring was stepped up in Fnideq, with a stronger security presence deployed at a number of sensitive points and beaches near the city, according to reports published by national media.

July 8, 2026: Spanish Supreme Court Decision No. 814/2026 was published. The decision confirmed that, where migrants are intercepted at sea, they may not be subject to immediate return at the border but must instead be dealt with under the return procedure provided for under the Spanish Aliens Act.

July 8, 2026: The first misleading content was identified on a Facebook page focusing on migration, Spain and Moroccans in Spain, among other topics. The page had more than 90,000 followers. The post claimed that “migrants intercepted at sea while attempting to reach Sebta or Melilla by swimming cannot be returned,” purportedly citing “a Spanish government delegation.” The post generated significant engagement.

July 13, 2026: Content claiming that “the Spanish Supreme Court has banned the immediate return of migrants” was identified in a group that, before being deleted, had more than 124,000 members and published an average of 231 posts per day.

July 14, 2026: Moroccan authorities intercepted 20 people attempting to migrate through Nador.

July 15, 2026: The Royal Moroccan Navy intercepted a collective attempt by 50 people to reach Sebta from Fnideq.

July 17, 2026: The Royal Moroccan Navy intercepted a mass attempt by dozens of migrants to swim towards Sebta.

July 19, 2026: Moroccan authorities intercepted a collective attempt involving 200 people through Tarajal and Belyounech.

July 15–27, 2026: Some 1,500 crossing attempts by adults and minors towards Sebta were recorded.

July 28, 2026: A young woman from Larache reached Sebta by swimming. Although more than 100 people crossed on July 28, a photograph of the woman and her friend raising a victory sign after reaching Sebta circulated widely and became a tool for promotion and misinformation based on an inaccurate or misleading interpretation of the Spanish Supreme Court ruling.

July 29, 2026: On the nights of Wednesday and Thursday, reports and content circulated widely in digital spaces claiming that “the border” was open.

July 29–30, 2026: Large numbers of young people, minors and families arrived in Fnideq, marking the beginning of the mass crossing operation. During field inquiries, different groups of young people told CNDH teams that they had received WhatsApp messages calling on them to go to the crossing gate after midnight in order to cross collectively into Sebta.

July 30, 2026: Thousands of Moroccan and foreign nationals, including young children, adolescents and women, crossed into Sebta. Intervention by the public authorities to “restrict” movement and prevent young people and minors from crossing into Sebta led to violent confrontations with the authorities.

July 30, 2026: Public security forces intervened to prevent crossing attempts towards Melilla in the areas around Beni Ansar and Farhana and along routes near the fence and coastline. The Council’s team recorded cases of stone-throwing, the burning of private vehicles and vehicles belonging to the authorities, and damage to public property.

July 29–31, 2026: Measures to “restrict” movement were observed, including the stopping of a number of journeys to cities in northern Morocco, particularly at bus and/or railway stations in Casablanca, Mohammedia, El Jadida, Kenitra, Fez, Oujda, Inezgane, Marrakesh, Ksar El Kebir and other cities.

July 31, 2026: Shops in Sebta were closed following a decision by the “head of the local government” and at the “request” of the local police, according to an official statement by the Confederation of Business Owners in Sebta.

July 31, 2026: Waves of voluntary returns were documented. During the voluntary returns that day, the field-monitoring team observed signs of beatings and various scars on the bodies of young people. Some had difficulty walking, either because of the alleged beatings and kicking they had suffered or because of exhaustion and physical strain.

August 1, 2026: Authorities were observed mobilising buses and other means of transport to return people from Fnideq to their cities of origin following their return from Sebta.

August 1, 2026: Groups belonging to an organisation calling itself the “National Front” in Spain arrived in Sebta. The group is classified as neo-Nazi. It had issued a mobilisation statement on July 31 calling for people to “defend” and protect Sebta against an “invasion.” Several videos documented acts of provocation, threats, pursuit and violence against newcomers and residents of Sebta, particularly Muslims. The group is known for its strong hostility towards migrants and Muslims.

August 2, 2026: Moroccan authorities announced that 40,000 people had crossed into Sebta and 1,135 towards Melilla, with 11 deaths recorded. The authorities in Sebta had separately announced first that 50,000 people had crossed, then 60,000, before the figure was raised to 72,000, according to Spanish estimates, with 80 deaths reported. The Council notes that discrepancies in the Spanish figures also concern the number of people who chose to leave voluntarily and those who decided to remain, as well as the number of unaccompanied children present in Sebta.

III. Consequences of Violence During the Mass Crossings

According to information available to the CNDH as of August 6, 2026, the use of violence and the burning of property during efforts to prevent Moroccan and foreign nationals from crossing into Sebta resulted in the following:

• The death toll rose to 14 people, according to Moroccan data. Separately, the authorities in Sebta announced 80 deaths.
• A number of bodies remain at the mortuary pending completion of identification procedures and their release to their families.
• A total of 136 minor injuries were recorded among civilians, while 13 injured people were referred to hospitals, particularly in cases involving fractures or requiring CT scans.
• According to information available to the Council, 87 members of the public security forces received medical consultations and treatment. The Spanish authorities have not reported any injuries among their security forces.
• Around 100 people were arrested in connection with the events in Sebta, including 11 minors. According to information available to the Council, 69 people are being prosecuted while 14 were released pending trial. Of the minors, six were placed in social care centres and five were handed over to their parents or guardians. The cases of six people were also closed on the grounds that no criminal offence had been established.
• Regarding property damage in Fnideq and at the Sebta crossing, the Council’s cross-checking of available information as of August 3, 2026, identified damage to approximately 61 private cars, 15 motorcycles and 18 vehicles belonging to the public security forces.
• In relation to the events in Beni Ansar municipality, 23 people facing prosecution were referred to the Nador Court of Appeal, including two foreign nationals. Eleven minors were also referred to the same court for investigation.

IV. Preliminary General Findings

• Thousands of Moroccan and foreign nationals crossed from Fnideq into Sebta. According to Moroccan data, 14 deaths were recorded, while official Spanish figures put the death toll at 80.
• The Council observed families of some of those who crossed waiting at the Sebta crossing point. It stresses the need to establish a joint and accountable mechanism to verify the number of deaths, complete the necessary identification procedures and ensure that the remains are returned to their families for burial in conditions that preserve human dignity.
• The Council recorded measures taken by the Moroccan authorities in several Moroccan cities to restrict the movement of large numbers of young people travelling towards northern cities.
• The crossings increased steadily from July 14, 2026, reaching their peak on July 30 and 31.
• There had been repeated attempts to cross into both cities, but the crossings gained unprecedented momentum and mobilisation following the publication of the Spanish Supreme Court decision and its interpretation by social media users.
• Digital groups played a central role throughout the events. They were used to offer, sell and purchase swimming equipment, life jackets, water-sports clothing and swimming fins; exchange practical guidance on preparations for crossing; mobilise people in different cities and at meeting points for collective travel; share information from the field; seek and provide guidance on travelling to Tangier and reaching Sebta; and continue coordination through WhatsApp and Telegram groups, including by sharing links to join them.
• The Council identified posts indicating the activity of intermediaries or networks that may be linked to human trafficking. These posts offered “services” to organise or facilitate crossings and provided information about surveillance points, routes, the most suitable times to cross and previous crossing experiences. The Council also observed a growing number of posts highlighting the successful arrival of groups in Sebta.
• The Council identified a number of foreign accounts within Moroccan groups disseminating false information and posts encouraging or facilitating crossings. According to material reviewed and documented by the Council, one group that circulated “guidance” and information on how to reach Sebta through WhatsApp deleted all telephone numbers bearing the international code of a foreign country. Another group reviewed by the Council contained more than 18 telephone numbers associated with that country.
• Thousands of people went without food and water for two days following the decision by local authorities to close shops, cafés and restaurants and refrain from providing assistance to people arriving in Sebta, including children, women and people in vulnerable situations. They were deprived of access to food and water, leaving them exposed to hunger and dehydration. According to repeated testimonies, security personnel intervened to remove young people from restaurants that had decided to assist some of those affected.
• Extremist groups attacked and pursued young people and minors through the streets of Sebta, subjecting them to various forms of abuse, including verbal abuse, beatings and stigmatisation. The field-monitoring team documented signs of beatings and various scars on young people’s bodies and heard testimonies from returnees alleging repeated and consistent cases of ill-treatment and assaults by Spanish public security forces, particularly “in places where there are no cameras,” according to their statements.
• The Regional Human Rights Commission of the Tangier-Tetouan-Al Hoceima region listened to the testimony of a person whose case had been widely circulated on social media and which appeared to show a threat to his physical integrity by a member of the public security forces. The Council will submit the testimony report to the Public Prosecutor’s Office for appropriate legal action. The Council notes, however, that according to its own observations and the testimony of the person concerned, an image of the incident had been altered and reconstructed using artificial intelligence. The incident was also accompanied by misleading content, including the publication of a photograph purportedly documenting injuries sustained by the person concerned but which was unrelated to the incident.
• The Council identified instances of media misinformation involving television channels that broadcast unverified reports of “crossings” and subsequently removed the content without explanation or apology. It also observed, in several cases, a rush by media outlets and social media users to put forward immediate and definitive hypotheses and interpretations following the events. Within the national media landscape, the Council also recorded cases in which statements were reported without the precautions required by professional ethics and the relevant international human rights standards, particularly those intended to protect people’s dignity and uphold children’s rights and best interests.
• The Council recorded cases of violence, attacks on private and public property and the burning of vehicles. It also documented cases of violence and violent confrontations between young people and minors, on the one hand, and public security forces, on the other, following attempts to prevent them from crossing. According to the field-monitoring team’s observations, these confrontations resulted in injuries among both young people and members of the public security forces.
• The Council documented the voluntary return of thousands of people who had crossed, as well as the forced return of others, including minors, based on videos reviewed by the Council.

V. General Conclusions

• The Council recalls the findings of its 2024 Annual Report on the human rights situation, which documented the spread of digital pages, accounts and groups that routinely publish explicit advertisements offering unlawful “services” to organise and facilitate irregular crossings by sea in exchange for money.
• The Council recorded a growing number of crossing attempts, particularly from July 14, followed by a peak on July 30.
• Digital spaces played a decisive role at every stage of preparations for the crossings and their aftermath in Sebta, and to a lesser extent in Melilla. The Spanish Supreme Court decision was used on these platforms as a source of misinformation, promotion, coordination, guidance and mobilisation. They also served to offer “services” related to human trafficking. The Council identified several accounts, telephone numbers and content creators from outside Morocco operating within Moroccan groups.
• The CNDH warns of the consequences of the political exploitation of these mass crossings and condemns the growing anti-migration discourse, attacks on the rights of migrants and their families, and the scale and intensity of incitement to hatred and racism against foreigners.
• The Council also recorded restrictions imposed by the Moroccan authorities on the movement of people travelling towards northern Morocco, as well as cases raising concerns about compliance with the rules and standards governing the use of force by Moroccan authorities when preventing Moroccan and foreign nationals from crossing, particularly the principles of necessity and proportionality.
• The Council recorded a number of incidents and practices that raise serious concerns about the extent to which human rights were respected and protected during the crossings.
• Cases affecting the physical integrity of people attempting to cross were documented involving both Spanish and Moroccan authorities. Cases involving the physical integrity of Moroccan public security forces were also recorded.
• The local authorities in Sebta decided not to provide the necessary assistance and ordered restaurants, cafés and large shops to close, depriving people attempting to cross of access to water and food.
• The Council observed non-compliance with the legal standards and safeguards applicable to return and removal procedures, including those relating to access to asylum procedures for foreign nationals.
• The Council documented failures to provide adequate assistance and protection to people subjected to racist and xenophobic assaults and attacks within Sebta.

Based on a number of testimonies, including those collected directly by the Council, the CNDH considers that collective crossing attempts by young people and minors towards Sebta or Melilla cannot be understood solely through a traditional approach that equates “migration” exclusively with vulnerability or poverty. The Council calls for a deeper understanding of the complexity of these movements, including the fact that migration can also be a personal decision, linked to profound changes in people’s “aspirations” to move from one place to another, within digital communities that, by their very nature, challenge the logic of borders and barriers.